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Our life with art is suffused with trust. We don’t just trust one another’s aesthetic testimony; we trust 
one another’s aesthetic actions. Audiences trust artists to have made it worth their while; artists trust 
audiences to put in the effort. Without trust, audiences would have little reason to put in the effort to 
understand difficult and unfamiliar art. I offer a theory of aesthetic trust, which highlights the im-
portance of trust in aesthetic sincerity. We trust in another’s aesthetic sincerity when we rely on them 
to fulfill their commitments to act for aesthetic reasons — rather than for, say, financial, social, or 
political reasons. We feel most thoroughly betrayed by an artist, not when they make bad art, but 
when they sell out. This teaches us something about the nature of trust in general. According to many 
standard theories, trust involves thinking the trusted to be cooperative or good-natured. But trust in 
aesthetic sincerity is different. We trust artists to be true to their own aesthetic sensibility, which 
might involve selfishly ignoring their audience’s needs. Why do we care so much about an artist’s 
sincerity, rather than merely trusting them to make good art? We emphasize sincerity when wish to 
encourage originality, rather than to demand success along predictable lines. And we ask for sincerity 
when our goal is to discover a shared sensibility. In moral life, we often try to force convergence 
through coordinated effort. But in aesthetic life, we often hope for the lovely discovery that our sensi-
bilities were similar all along. And for that we need to ask for sincerity, rather than overt coordination. 
 
 
Here are some feelings I have about Kanye West’s music and its reception. Through Life of 
Pablo, his albums grew more difficult and more alienating. After some time and effort, however, 
I came to find each one deeply rewarding. But as his work became harsher and more structur-
ally bewildering, each album took me longer to come to terms with. I pressed on through those 
early difficult listens because, by that point, I had come to trust in West as a musical artist. 
Other people tuned out as West’s work evolved. They had deeply loved his earlier work, 
but were unwilling to invest energy in the attempt to come to terms with his later work. I have 
feelings about them, too: I think they are doing something ever-so-slightly wrong. It’s not just 
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that they are missing out on a bit of extra pleasure. It’s that they are failing to offer West the 
kind of trust that he deserves, given their prior relationship to his work. And then there are 
people who never gave West’s music a chance. Some of these people are my friends and fellow 
appreciators, with whom I have a long history of listening together and appreciating things 
together — a history of shared sensibility. When such aesthetic compatriots refuse to even try 
to listen with an open mind despite my gushing — and despite massed critical consensus1 — I 
feel that they are failing to trust when they should. 
And we can feel betrayed towards artists, too. The consensus among fans and critics seems 
to be that West’s most recent album ye was tossed off without much real effort. Longtime West 
listeners felt deeply let down by the album and by the artist behind it, if the online outpouring 
was any judge. Music critic Meaghen Geavey writes: 
 
We have reached the point where West’s once-constant churn of ideas—usually inspired, reg-
ularly awkward, but always like nothing else out there—is barely meeting the standard of “Lift 
Yourself,” the desperate troll banger that preceded ye, corralling every meaning of the word 
“scat.” The problem with ye is not that it was made by an unrepentant asshole, but that it is 
thoroughly, exhaustingly boring—a word I never imagined would apply to a generation’s most 
reliable innovator…. ye feels rickety, almost, as if removing a bassline would send the whole 
thing toppling… It’s as if he’d completely forgotten the music was the reason we loved him in 
the first place… [In “Ghost Town”] He gargles a few half-finished thoughts, his tone not so 
much sad as dazed, re-using the verse melody from “Runaway” over a sample chop that, at one 
point, sounds a whole lot like his work with Jay-Z… It’s an ode to total numbness, and some-
how it’s also ye’s emotional climax, an irony as apt as it is depressing.2 
 
What unites these various responses is the presence of trust and its kin. Richard Holton 
notes that there are characteristic normatively-laden attitudes which surround trust: “When you 
trust someone to do something, you rely on them to do it, and you regard that reliance in a 
 1	Aaron	Meskin	pointed	out,	in	personal	communication,	that,	in	the	Village	Voice	Pazz	&	Jop	meta-poll,	the	two	most	critically	lauded	artists	over	the	history	of	the	meta-poll	are	Bob	Dylan	and	Kanye	West.	Note	that	I	am	not	claiming	here	that	one	should	adopt	an	aesthetic	judgment	merely	on	the	say-so	of	another.	I	am	suggesting	only	that	we	might	try	to	appreciate	something	based	on	the	testimony	of	another	(Nguyen	2017a,	2019).	2	https://pitchfork.com/reviews/albums/kanye-west-ye/	
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certain way; you have a readiness to feel betrayal should it be disappointed, and gratitude should 
it be upheld” (Holton 1994, 67). And, in aesthetic life, we are not simply surprised when an 
artist lets us down; we can feel betrayed. When somebody mistrusts our recommendations when 
we think we have earned their trust, we are hurt. When I discover some hidden perfect subtlety, 
buried deep in the innards of some labyrinthine novel, I feel gratitude that the author had 
trusted their audience enough to place it there. 
But the role of trust in art — in our relationships to artists, audiences, critics, and fellow 
appreciators — has been relatively under-explored, at least in philosophical aesthetics. Philos-
ophers of art have focused their attentions on one very specific kind of trust: the sort involved 
in the acquisition of aesthetic knowledge via testimony. They have debated, at great length, 
whether and why there is really a problem with acquiring aesthetic judgment strictly through 
testimony.3 But there are many other kinds of aesthetic trust. Artists create subtle, complex 
works, trusting their audiences to discover those works’ more esoteric qualities. Audiences in-
vest their time and energy in those works, trusting artists to have created with dedication and 
sincerity. Museum-goers trust curators to choose aesthetically profound works and not just aim 
to maximize ticket sales. Actors trust their directors; classical musicians trust their conductors. 
Painters trust manufacturers to be meticulous in making pigments and paper. Readers trust 
critics to get at the heart of an artwork, instead of just saying clever stuff to advance their ca-
reers. 
In this paper, I explore the central role of trust in our lives with art. I will start by considering 
one particular role for trust. Trust makes it possible for us to aesthetically change and grow, by 
 3	For	starters,	see	Hopkins	(2001,	2011);	Budd	(2003);	Livingston	(2003);	Meskin	(2004,	2007);	Laetz	(2008),	Whiting	(2015);	Robson	(2015);	Lord	(2016);	Mckinnon	(2017);	Ransom	(2017);	and	Nguyen	(2017a,	2019).	
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giving us reasons to approach new and unfamiliar art. Without trust, audiences would have 
little reason to put in the effort to understand inherently difficult art, and artists would have 
little reason to hope that audiences would rise to the challenge. 
There are, I claim, many forms of trust in aesthetic life, including trust in each other’s aes-
thetic competence and in each other’s steadfastness to a style or a sensibility. But I will highlight 
a form of trust that seems especially characteristic of much contemporary aesthetic life: trust in 
aesthetic sincerity. In much current aesthetic practice, we typically trust one another to act from 
aesthetic considerations, rather than financial, social, or other non-aesthetic considerations. 
Suppose an artist makes a wild stylistic shift — a bold artistic experiment, following their own 
aesthetic sensibility — and it turns out terribly. They have failed to make good art, but they 
have succeeded in being aesthetically sincere. And our greatest ire is often directed, not at the 
artist that makes bad art, but at the insincere artist — the sellout. 
My goals here are two-fold. First, I hope to show that our understanding of our art practices 
will benefit from thinking carefully about aesthetic trust. Second, I hope to expand our under-
standing of trust in general. Much of the recent discussion of the normative dimension of trust 
emerges from analyses of moral scenarios. But there is more to life than morality.4 Thinking 
about aesthetic life will help deepen our understanding of the varied forms of trust. Trust in 
aesthetic sincerity, it turns out, has a special character — one that is quite distinctive from the 
way we trust in the moral and epistemic spheres. I suggest that this is because of our distinctive 
goals in aesthetic life. We ask for sincerity, rather than kindliness, cooperativeness, or reliability, 
 4	I	owe	this	way	of	framing	the	issue	to	Jonathan	Gingerich.	This	paper	will	focus	on	the	contrast	between	aesthetic	trust,	and	moral	trust,	focusing	on	the	normative	dimension.	There	is	another	literature,	on	the	epis-temology	of	trust	and	testimony,	that	is	a	bit	further	afield.	I	have	discussed	the	relationship	between	trust	in	aesthetic	and	epistemic		testimony	in	Nguyen	(2019).	
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because we are trying to nurture creativity and originality, and because we are hoping to en-
courage a very particular form of shared experience. 
 
 
The motivational problem of difficult art 
Appreciating art requires investment. It requires, at the very least, time and energy. It usu-
ally also takes willpower, focus, and emotional resources. Experiencing art can be risky, too. 
Opening yourself to an artwork can leave you emotionally vulnerable. You can expose yourself 
to psychic harm from manipulative or abusive art. 
Many of these concepts — openness, vulnerability, emotional risk — are fairly alien to mod-
ern aesthetics, and would require significant work to render into philosophically legible terms. 
Let’s start, then, with a more minimal observation: that some art requires a significant invest-
ment of resources before its value is adequately revealed. Some works seems impenetrable, at 
first. It takes some devoted effort to apprehend their structure — to detect their subtle beauty, 
or to make sense out of the seeming chaos. Call something difficult art if it requires a significant 
investment of mental, emotional, and other personal resources to access its value, and if there is 
relatively little direct sign of its value early in the appreciative process.5 Difficulty can be rela-
tive. Some art is difficult for us simply because we lack the appropriate familiarity and experi-
ence. When we are raised in one tradition, and then confront work from an alien tradition, we 
often lack the skills to find the value in it on a first pass — or a second, or a fifth. On the other 
hand, some art is inherently difficult: like the oblique density and texture of Marianne Moore’s 
 5	I	do	not	claim	that	this	tracks	the	natural	use	of	the	term	“difficult	art”.	It	is	a	stipulative	definition	for	the	sake	of	brevity.	The	discussion	of	difficult	art	in	this	paper	owes	a	significant	debt	to	conversations	with	Matt	Strohl.	
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poetry, or John Coltrane’s dense late experiments with free jazz, or Joanna Newsom’s Milk-
Eyed Mender, so full of crackling, but expressive, aural discomforts. 
What reasons could a potential appreciator have to try and get over those early roadblocks? 
On first encounter, it can be hard to tell difficult art from bad art. To the uninitiated, Coltrane’s 
later work, and much of the free jazz which follows, is indistinguishable from random noise. 
Many can see no difference between abstract expressionist paintings and the random splatter-
ing of a child. And some forms of difficulty are subtle. The difficulty itself can be invisible to the 
careless eye. Audiences raised on Western modernist poetry, for example, often miss the quality 
of Basho’s minimalist haiku and Tu Fu’s plain-spoken verse. These poems’ superficial clarity 
masks their artistic depth. The verse can seem simpleminded and childish to those raised on the 
more willfully obscure poetry of, say, John Berryman and Jorie Graham. Similarly, to those 
unversed in the complexities of hip-hop production, it’s easy to mistake Kanye West’s deliber-
ately rough vocal work for mere ineptness — and miss the complex relationship between the 
simplistic vocal work and the dense, atmospheric production work in which it is embedded. 
One can hear that aesthetic difficulty implied in the dismissals of many a detractor, who 
mock abstract painting and free jazz for being so much random gibberish. To the initiated, it is 
clear what’s going on here: the detractor hasn’t put in the work to get over the difficulty hump, 
and so does not yet see what there is to be seen. More importantly, they mistake their own 
insensitivity for a lack of quality in the work itself. They see nothing, and take that as a sign 
that there is nothing to be seen. To somebody who sees how good the art is, this dismissive 
attitude might seem like pure arrogance. But something more complicated is going on. The de-
tractor’s position is actually quite reasonable, up to a point. After all, we are limited beings, who 
cannot expend energy willy-nilly. We usually only spend aesthetic attention where we have 
good reason to think that our investment will yield good returns. And the value of difficult 
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works is, by nature, veiled. Difficult works present us, then, with a motivational puzzle. If their 
value is not apparent on their face, what could motivate somebody who does not yet see, to put 
in the effort to see? In a world with such an overwhelming amount of art, how can we tell the 
bad from the as-yet-uncomprehended? 
Since the uninitiated cannot perceive the potential value of a difficult work for themselves, 
their reasons for spending effort in pursuit of that value cannot come from their appraisal of the 
work itself.6 The reasons can come, however, from the social context of the work. We can ex-
pend effort on difficult art because somebody we trust tells us to. Such trust is crucial for our 
personal development as appreciators. How else would could we expand into new genres, could 
we grow out of our early narrow aesthetic channels? How else would we know where to look? 
Trust can provide reasons for us to get past the apparent surface valuelessness or incomprehen-
sibility of a work.7 Thus, trust underwrites the expansion of our aesthetic sensibilities. This is 
not to say that there could never be any difficult art without trust. But in order to make a regular 
and reliable practice out of inherently difficult art, we need trust. Trust enables audiences to 
locate worthwhile difficult art. And trust gives social assurances to artists who make difficult 
art, since they can rely on their audiences spending the energy to find and apprehend their art. 
We now have a diagnosis of the person who dismisses, at a first glance, difficult works as 
obviously worthless, and who stays firm on their early negative judgment — even in the face of 
the praise from trustworthy sources. Theirs is not a problem of brute insensitivity or arrogance 
 6	Notice	that	some	work	has	an	easy	surface,	which	invites	the	appreciator	in,	so	that	they	might	spend	enough	time	to	appreciate	the	work’s	more	difficult	parts.	That	is	certainly	a	strategy	—	and	one	worth	inves-tigating	elsewhere	—	but,	by	my	definition,	such	things	do	not	count	as	“difficult	works”.	Importantly,	work	from	alien	traditions	typically	appears	to	the	uninitiated	as	difficult	through	and	through.	7	Sherri	Irvin	(2007)	makes	a	somewhat	similar	point	in	her	discussion	of	the	harms	of	forgery.	She	sug-gests	that	we	need	to	trust	others	to	further	our	aesthetic	understanding.	Our	two	discussions	concern	differ-ent	functions	of	trust,	though	I	believe	them	to	be	compatible.	My	claim	here	concerns	the	identification	of	val-uable	works,	and	hers	concerns	how	trust	provides	new	data	points	from	which	we	can	construct	new	aes-thetic	understandings.	
 8 
towards the artworks themselves. After all, we need a positive reason to put in the extra effort 
with difficult art, and difficult art will not provide the uninitiated with that reason directly. It’s 
the social matrix surrounding the art that lets us surmount the motivational problem. The prob-
lem with the dogmatically dismissive person, then, lies not in their brute insensitivity to art itself, 
but in their refusal to trust where they should. Such a person trusts their own quick reaction 
that, say, all rap is musically worthless over the assurances of another sensitive soul who says 
that there are riches to be found there. Such a person is unwilling to admit that their own quick 
judgment might admit of lacunae. The dismisser here is a peculiar kind of aesthetic solipsist, 
who is unwilling to admit the possibility that others might possess aesthetic sensitivities which 
the solipsist themselves might lack.8 
Notice, too, that we trust not only recommenders, but also artists, communities, and styles. 
I pay attention to Coltrane’s later work because I love his earlier work and I trust him not to be 
wasting my time. I push through the seeming incomprehensibility of Ornette Coleman’s free 
jazz because, in part, I know that Coltrane admired Coleman’s music. I trust curators that these 
wild splotches of abstract expressionist paint are worth poring over. And I trust certain com-
munities as a whole, like the New York jazz scene and or the Atlanta trap scene — enough to 
be willing to spend at least a bit of attention on any artist who emerges from those scenes. 
Thinking in terms of trust will help us to chart the social practices involved with the art 
world. It can help bring to light how certain key pitfalls and traps of trust can recur in the world 
of art. Consider, for example, the potential for dangerous social feedback loops in our aesthetic 
search procedure. Often, we put in the effort to understand some new piece of difficult art 
 8	My	claim	here	is	not	that	one	should	defer	to	the	judgments	of	aesthetic	experts,	but	that	one	should	let	the	contrary	judgments	of	experts	give	one	a	reason	to	look	again.	For	more	on	this	topic,	see	Cross	(2017)	and	Nguyen	(2017a;	2019).	
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because some trusted expert recommended it. But how did we come to trust that expert in the 
first place? Typically, we pick experts by applying our own capacities of aesthetic judgment and 
our own background beliefs about what’s worth paying attention to. We trust those experts 
whose tastes we recognize, in part through their consonance with, and demonstrated capacity 
to extend, our own tastes. But this threatens us with the possibility of a vicious circle of trust 
— one whose pattern should be familiar from other domains. We are threatened here by the 
possibility of an aesthetic echo chamber. I might select experts based on my narrow tastes, and 
arrive at a set of experts who echo my own narrowness. Those experts might give me reason 
only to further develop my aesthetic skills within that thin band. Imagine, for instance, that I 
had been raised in a tradition of classical European music, and then encountered a distinct, 
difficult form of music from a tradition with which I was unfamiliar — say a difficult work of 
hip hop. The aesthetic qualities of hip hop require a completely different mode of listening and 
attention. The listener must develop a different set of sensitivities and skills. Here’s the danger: 
I might not recognize the aesthetic quality of the hip hop for myself. At the same time, I might 
also fail to trust the appropriate experts to guide me through hip hop and help me to develop 
my hip hop listening skills. The structure of my social network might leave me with no motiva-
tional traction on hip hop. 
Much depends, however, on the topology of my social network. If my network contains 
many individuals who care about both classical and hip hop, I can avoid this aesthetic echo 
chamber. If, on the other hand, the worlds of classical music and hip hop are segregated, I will 
tend to identify as experts those whose interests are also narrowly spent on classical music. 
Using my network of trusted experts will likely only reinforce my belief in the superiority of 
classical music. Over time, trust in my curated set of experts will direct me to spend more at-
tention with classical music, which will further refine my appreciative skills for that music. This 
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will create a comprehensibility gap between the familiar and the unfamiliar, accompanied by a 
coverage gap in my network of trust networks. When looking into unfamiliar music traditions, 
difficult music is indistinguishable from bad music. So, lacking the right trust network, I won’t 
be presented with the right reasons to push me past my initial uncomprehending impressions of 
hip hop.9 This possibility is heightened if the comprehensibility gap falls along the same lines as 
credence gaps between different social groups, such as the unjust credence gap between racial 
groups (Fricker 2007). 
 
 
Why trust? 
There are two questions we might now ask. First, why is trust the right concept for thinking 
about our aesthetic choices? Why not think, instead, that we were simply predicting future 
aesthetic success based on inference from past success? Perhaps we are simply inferring from 
the greatness of the last few Cardi B albums that the new album will also be fantastic. Second, 
even if we really are trusting each other in aesthetic life, should we be? Let’s spend some time 
with the simpler descriptive question before we turn to the justificatory question. 
Trust sits at a complex nexus of distinctively normative concepts. As Annette Baier says, 
when we trust, we make ourselves vulnerable. In Baier’s account, to trust is to depend on the 
good will of another (Baier 1986, 234-5). Furthermore, trust comes packaged with some specific 
kinds of affective response. When a trusted person lets us down, we do not simply revise our 
 9	This	account	of	vicious	circles	of	trust	draws	from	my	analysis	of	expert	trust	loops	in	aesthetic	and	moral	testimony,	and	my	discussion	of	echo	chambers	as	trust	manipulators.	See	Nguyen	(2018a,	2018b)	for	an	in-depth	analysis.	My	own	thinking	about	echo	chambers	actually	begun,	not	with	political	cases,	but	with	aesthetic	cases	like	these.	For	an	account	of	acquiring	trust	from	experts	by	calibrating	via	agreement,	see	Philip	Kitcher’s	(1993,	320-3)	account	of	scientific	trust.	The	notion	of	coverage	gap	draws	from	Sanford	Goldberg’s	(2010,	154-184)	discussion	of	coverage	reliability.	
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expectations to match. We feel betrayed; we think the trusted person deserves condemnation. 
And sometimes we are hurt when another fails to trust us as much as we deserve. On a first 
pass, these affective phenomena seem to indicate that trust is pervasive throughout our life with 
art. Fans feel betrayed by their beloved artist’s selling out; museum-goers would feel betrayed 
if the curator’s selections turned out to be paid product placements. And we can feel betrayed 
by artistic failures of a certain register. For example, music critic Jordan Sargent writes of 
West’s ye: 
 
Kanye used to justify such flights of imagination, his albums obsessively dissected, ranked, and 
considered in the grand pantheon of human artistic achievement. ye makes expending that sort 
of mental energy seem incredibly silly. Let us never speak of it again.10 
 
Importantly, we trust each other over all sorts of things. Trust is not just about accepting 
others’ testimony. We trust each other not only to speak truly, but to act well. We trust people 
to fix our cars, to look after our investments, and to stop us from doing something stupid after 
we’ve had too much to drink. So, too, many of our aesthetic relationships involve, not just trust-
ing one another’s aesthetic testimony, but trusting one another’s aesthetic actions. We trust art-
ists to create sincerely; we trust curators to display worthwhile art. We trust curators to direct 
our time and energy down worthwhile paths. We trust our teachers with the development of 
our aesthetic sensibilities. 
It will help here to make use of the recent philosophical literature on trust.11 Trust, in the 
standard accounting, is a three part relationship. There is a truster, a trusted, and an entrusted 
 10	https://www.spin.com/2018/06/kanye-west-ye-review/.	For	the	record,	I	enjoyed	ye	decently	enough,	and	felt	no	betrayal	myself	—	though	I	do	not	think	it	rises	the	heights	of	My	Beautiful	Dark	Twisted	Fantasy,	
Yeezus,	or	my	own	favorite,	The	Life	of	Pablo.	11	The	summary	which	follows	draws	from	Baier	(1986);	Holton	(1994);	Jones	(1996);	O’Neill	(2002);	Jones	(2012);	and	Simpson	(2018).	Particularly	useful	summaries	of	the	recent	trust	literature	can	be	found	in	Simpson	(2012)	and	Hawley	(2014).	
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act or domain. I trust my banker with my money; I trust a teacher with my child’s education 
and life. Baier suggests, however, that the colloquial use of the term “trust” indicates two possi-
ble sorts of attitudes. The first is one of simple reliance. Reliance is an attitude we can take 
towards ordinary objects. We rely on the shelf to hold up our books; we rely on our car to run. 
Reliance is an attitude of simple expectation. We rely on something to do some act based on our 
mere prediction that it will do so. 
Reliance, by itself, isn’t normatively loaded. I don’t blame the shelf when it fails to hold up 
my book, nor do I feel betrayed when it collapses. I may feel disappointed, but the shelf’s failure 
does not evoke from me the more accusatory attitude of betrayal. But there is a different form 
of trust — a richer, more normatively loaded trust — which we sometimes hold towards persons 
and person-like institutions.12 It is this richer form of trust that gives rise to a wider variety of 
complex affective responses; it puts us in the world of praise, blame, and betrayal. Though I 
had relied on the shelf, I don’t blame it for failing. However, if Ikea had implied that the shelf 
could bear such a load, I might reasonably blame Ikea. This reveals that where I had only relied 
on the bookshelf, I had richly trusted Ikea. 
Following the standard usage in the recent academic literature (and departing from looser 
colloquial usage), I will use “reliance” to refer to the thinner, merely predictive attitude, and 
“trust” to refer to the richer, more normatively loaded attitude. On most accounts, trust is ana-
lyzed as reliance plus something extra. When I trust you, I rely on you, but I also hold some 
further normative attitude towards that reliance. We can, then, sort between cases of trust and 
 12	Elsewhere,	I	have	objected	to	the	anthropocentric	focus	of	the	trust	discussion,	and	attempted	to	offer	an	expanded	theory	of	trust	which	can	make	sense	of	trust	and	betrayal	towards	objects	(Nguyen	forthcom-ing).	Since	I	know	this	to	be	a	highly	controversial	view,	I	have	avoided	relying	on	this	expanded	theory	of	trust	in	this	paper,	and	sought	to	make	my	discussion	here	compatible	with	more	widely	accepted	ac-countings	of	trust.	Those	convinced	by	that	expanded	theory	should	treat	the	present	paper	as	an	analysis	of	a	particular	sub-type	of	trust:	that	of	interpersonal,	commitment-based	trust.	
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reliance by looking at the negative reactions evoked by their failure. As Katherine Hawley puts 
it, when something fails to live up to our mere reliance, we are only disappointed. When some-
body fails to live up to our trust, we feel betrayed (Hawley 2014, 3). 
Notice that our attitudes towards people can also vary between trust and reliance. If I reg-
ularly see you exiting the building exactly at 5 PM and come to use your departure to time my 
own exit, I am merely relying on you. I ought not feel betrayed if you suddenly change your 
schedule. If, in the other hand, you had promised to knock on my door at 5 PM to remind me 
to get going, then I can blame you if you don’t. Trust can arise implicitly, through our taking on 
parts and roles in some cooperative endeavor. Suppose we have built a life together and evolved 
a system where one of us makes breakfast while the other makes coffee and walks the dog. We 
each know that the other depends on us to take care of our morning’s share. Even though we 
have never exchanged promises or signed contracts, we surely have come to trust each other. 
What might ground that reaction of betrayal? In an early and influential account, Baier 
suggests that to trust somebody is to rely on their goodwill towards you (Baier 1986, 234-236). 
The betrayal, then, amounts to discovering that they lack goodwill. As appealing as it might 
seem, however, the goodwill account admits of significant counterexamples. Onora O’Neill 
points out that I may trust a doctor without thinking they bear me any goodwill. They may be 
irritated by me and have no particular positive feeling towards me, but they have taken an oath 
to care for their patients, and I depend on them to fulfill that oath (ONeill 2002, 14). Profes-
sionalism, then, sometimes can serve as an adequate substitute for goodwill, as grounds for trust. 
And, as Hawley says, sometimes we don’t want to enter into relationships of trust, even when 
it is apparent that goodwill is involved. I may be willing to cook dinner most nights for my 
spouse, and I may do it out of goodwill, but I don’t want my spouse to come to trust me to cook 
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dinner. I may wish to preserve for myself the right to withdraw from that practice without in-
curring blame (Hawley 2014, 7). 
Of the various candidate theories of trust in the running, I find Hawley’s positive account 
the most convincing. It is crucial, says Hawley, that there are three distinct attitudes of trust we 
can take towards others. We can actively trust them or actively distrust them — but we can also 
simply refrain from trust or distrust. I trust my partner to care for me. I distrust this scumbag 
politician’s promises. But my attitude towards my next door neighbor’s cooking is neither active 
trust nor active distrust: it is non-trust. It’s not the case that I trust them to bring me food, but 
it’s not the case that I distrust them, either. Our relationship has not yet entered into the domain 
of trust and distrust. 
Most standing theories of trust cannot account for this tripartite distinction. For example, 
traditional goodwill accounts of trust — that treat trust as simply a belief in another’s goodwill 
— can capture only two states: trust or distrust. To solve this problem, Hawley offers the fol-
lowing account: 
 
To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to 
rely upon her to meet that commitment. To distrust someone to do something is to believe that 
she has a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely upon her to meet that commitment. (Hawley 
2014, 10) 
 
The commitment account neatly explains the difference between trust, distrust and non-
trust. When I trust somebody, I take them to have made a commitment and I rely on it. When 
I distrust somebody, I take them to have made a commitment, yet expect them to fail to meet 
that commitment. And when I have an attitude of non-trust, I do not believe that they have 
made a commitment at all. This account also explains how one can trust wrongly. Trusting 
somebody involves believing that they have made a commitment. If I trust you to do something, 
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and you’ve actually made no commitment to do it, then it would be wrong of me to hold you to 
that unmade commitment or to reproach you for failing to fulfill it.13 
As Hawley says, in order for this to be a plausible account, we must hold to a very loose 
notion of commitment. Commitments, she says, can be explicit or implicit; they can be weighty 
or trivial. They can come through external circumstances or by taking up various social roles. 
Commitments can arise without any explicit promising, when we enter into practices of mutual 
dependences and expectations. Note that Hawley’s account builds in skillfulness, too. I don’t 
simply trust you to try. Trusting you involves relying on your actual ability to meet your com-
mitments. 
 
 
Aesthetic commitments 
Hawley’s account, I think, gets us a long way towards understanding what’s going on the 
social relationships which surround and bolster our art practices.14 We do not simply rely on 
each other; we trust each other. In Hawley’s terms, that means that we do not simply rely on 
each other's predictability; we rely on each other's commitments, and feel betrayed when those 
commitments aren’t met. And we do feel betrayed in the aesthetic realm. I would feel betrayed 
if I found out, say, that David Simon chose the character arcs and character fates in The Wire 
based entirely on market research about which characters would sell the most action figures.15 
 13	I	won’t	rehearse	the	reasons	for	thinking	Hawley’s	view	is	superior	to	the	available	candidates;	her	own	defense	is,	to	my	mind,	quite	satisfying.	14	I	don’t	necessarily	think	that	Hawley’s	account	is	the	complete	account	for	all	uses	of	the	term	“trust”.	Thomas	Simpson	(2012)	may	be	right	when	he	says	that	the	term	arises	in	many	distinctive	situations	of	the	breakdown	of	cooperative	activity,	and	that	each	different	context	leads	to	a	different	use	of	the	term	‘trust’.	But	I	think	Hawley’s	account	clearly	captures	one	use	of	the	term	which	fits	well	with	the	use	in	the	aesthetic	context.	15	Obviously,	Omar.	
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Recall Hawley’s suggestion that many of the commitments of trust arise, not from explicit prom-
ises, but from the roles we adopt. Many formal and informal roles within the art world — artist, 
curator, critic, appreciator, and even simply friendly interlocutor — seem to come packaged 
with a set of commitments. Such commitments seem part and parcel of our social practices of 
art-making and art consumption.16 Our response of aesthetic betrayal reveals that we take our-
selves to be involved in the practice of making and receiving aesthetic commitments. 
Let’s look more closely at the nature of aesthetic trust. This will help me to explain why 
exactly I think that it is trust, rather than reliance, that is in operation here. First, consider the 
following different forms of aesthetic trust we might take up. (I take the following to be schema 
for general classes; different particular instances can add to or modify these basic schema in 
various ways.) 
 
Trust in aesthetic competence 
To trust in X’s aesthetic competence is to rely on X to meet their commitment to successfully 
bring about aesthetically valuable states of affairs (for some set of acts). 
 
Trust in aesthetic sincerity 
To trust in X’s aesthetic sincerity is to rely on X to meet their commitment to act from aes-
thetic considerations (for some set of acts). 
 
Trust in aesthetic steadfastness 
To trust in X’s aesthetic steadfastness is to rely on X to act from their commitment to a 
specified aesthetic sensibility (for some set of acts).17 
 
 16	I	mean	“our”	here	in	a	fairly	local	way.	The	attitudes	and	practices	I’m	analyzing	here	seem	distinctive	of	relatively	recent	Western	European	art	practice	and	its	direct	descendent.	It	seems	perfectly	plausible	that	other	traditions	of	art	practice	would	involve	different	commitments.	17	I	am	presuming,	for	the	sake	of	brevity,	that	aesthetic	considerations,	values,	and	sensibilities	are	cen-tral	to	art.	Some	might	claim	a	broader	set	of	characteristics	for	art.	For	example,	one	might	think	that	the	realm	of	art	includes	aesthetic	considerations	(such	as	beauty	and	grace)	and	artistic	considerations	(such	as	originality	and	creativity).	In	that	case	one	could	mirror	my	proposed	various	definitions	of	‘aesthetic	trust’	with	a	parallel	accounts	of	‘artistic	trust’,	and	what	I	say	would	apply	to	both.	
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The “some set of acts” condition specifies that aesthetic trust is limited to some specific do-
main. My trust in West’s aesthetic sincerity only covers his acts in the realm of music-making, 
music recommendation and the like. I have no expectation that West will act from strictly aes-
thetic considerations, say, in his banking, or even in other aesthetic fields, like his fashion. 
These proposed forms of aesthetic trust are quite different. Trust in aesthetic competence is 
trust in another to actually do it well, aesthetically speaking. If I were to trust in a musician’s 
aesthetic competence, I would rely on their commitment to make good music. If I were to trust 
in a movie reviewer’s aesthetic competence, I would rely on their commitment to reliably rec-
ommend good movies. And trust in aesthetic competence is broken by aesthetic failure. If I had 
such trust for somebody, I would feel betrayed when they made bad music or recommended 
bad movies. 
Trust in aesthetic sincerity, on the other hand, is trust that somebody will act guided by 
aesthetic considerations. Trust in aesthetic sincerity does not demand that the trusted succeed 
in their attempt. Such trust would not be broken by aesthetic failure, in and of itself. It would 
be broken by the trusted person’s acting for the wrong sorts of reasons — say, by acting from 
financial considerations or considerations of social status. Notice how different trust in sincerity 
is from trust in competence. If a musician makes a bold experiment, guided by their own aes-
thetic sensibility, and fails utterly — if they follow their artistic muse off a cliff — this would be 
a failure of aesthetic competence, but not of aesthetic sincerity. Trust in sincerity is broken by 
the aesthetic sellout, not by the aesthetic failure. 
Finally, trust in aesthetic steadfastness is trust in somebody to stay the course. A member in 
a traditional folk music scene might have such trust for their fellows to continue making and 
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caring about music in that style.18 Notice, though, how different the demand for steadfastness 
is from the demand for sincerity. Imagine, for instance, that our traditional folk musician fell in 
love with drum machines and hip hop sampling and changed musical direction. That could be 
a violation of steadfastness, but not of sincerity. Similarly, if that musician’s work became more 
listless and tired, but remained within the aesthetic sensibility to which they had committed, 
they may have failed in their commitment to competence, but succeeded in their commitment 
to be steadfast. 
Though these various aesthetic commitments can sometimes be made directly between in-
dividuals, in contemporary aesthetic life most aesthetic commitments seem role-based. We take 
up these commitments implicitly when we adopt certain roles, and these commitments are typ-
ically directed at others via their roles. The museum curator, in taking up their role, takes on 
certain aesthetic commitments to the museum’s audience. The movie reviewer, in taking up their 
role, takes on certain commitments to their readership. We can detect the presence of those 
commitments by imagining how they might be betrayed — like if we found out that the curator 
was taking bribes, or the movie reviewer was strategically condemning popular movies in order 
to go viral on Twitter. And we typically hold people to their commitments only when they are 
acting from within those roles. I expect a museum curator to recommend aesthetically valuable 
works when they are acting as a curator. When they praise their toddler’s scribblings at home, 
they are clearly speaking not as a museum curator, but as a parent. 
Why might these various forms of trust be so important in aesthetic life? Let’s start with 
aesthetic competence. Trust in aesthetic competence is easy to explain; it solves the motivational 
problem of difficult art. Trusting in West’s aesthetic competence will, by itself, give me reason 
 18	In	Jennifer	Lena’s	(2012)	sociological	typology	of	musical	communities,	the	“traditionalist”	community	type	is	marked	by	its	devotion	to	unchanging	stylistic	purity.	
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to devote time and attention to his new album. When we trust in the competence of artists, 
reviewers, and curators, we will have guidance about where to spend our efforts, and reasons 
to broaden our tastes. Trust in, and commitment towards, aesthetic competence has a clear 
function in aesthetic life. 
But we often seem even more invested in aesthetic sincerity. Though we can feel betrayal 
towards breaches of trust in aesthetic competence, our most vicious reactions are typically to 
betrayals of trust in aesthetic sincerity. We seem to feel more profoundly betrayed by the sellout 
than by the sincere failure. Suppose I find that West’s new album tries to do far too many new 
things at once, collapsing under the weight of its own ambitions. It’s a failure, but one that arises 
from a sincere attempt. I myself would react with only the mildest sense of betrayal — though 
I might feel quite disappointed. On the other hand, suppose I thought that the new album was 
oversimplified in a bid for commercial success. I would likely feel quite betrayed. I have some 
small degree of trust in West’s aesthetic competence, but have, apparently, a much stronger and 
more normatively loaded trust in his aesthetic sincerity. And I take it that this pattern is a fa-
miliar one across many sectors of contemporary aesthetic life. 
Obviously, all three forms of aesthetic trust can and do exist in certain specific contexts, in 
various and potentially overlapping ways. Different people make all sorts of commitments. A 
musician promises their manager that the next album will be amazing; when that manager 
stakes their credibility on that album’s success, they are trusting in the musician’s aesthetic com-
petence. My childhood friends and I swear to each other that we will keep on loving the same 
seventies kung-fu flicks; we are trusting in each other’s aesthetic steadfastness. Similarly, shared 
commitments to aesthetic steadfastness are characteristic of traditionalist musical communities, 
such as, say, the bluegrass preservationist community. 
But, I claim, trust in aesthetic sincerity is particularly characteristic of contemporary aesthetic life. 
 20 
Aesthetic life shares, with other forms of life, trust in various forms of competence. But aesthetic 
life is often distinguished by an equal, and sometimes greater, degree of trust in sincerity. I will, 
in short order, attempt to offer an account of the functional importance of trust in aesthetic 
sincerity. Before I do, some clarifications of my account of aesthetic sincerity are in order. 
First, what do I mean by “aesthetic considerations”? I can’t hope to offer a complete ren-
dering here, but there are enough obvious contrasts to get a first grip on the notion. When I 
buy a painting because I think it is beautiful or dramatic, I am acting from aesthetic considera-
tions. When I buy it simply as a good investment, or because it is the right size and thickness to 
cover a hole in my wall, I am not acting from aesthetic considerations.19 I have left “aesthetic 
considerations” intentionally vague here, so that you may plug in your preferred account of 
aesthetic action and motivation. However, let me offer a sample plug-in, which will help flesh 
out how such an account might go. 
Dominic Lopes has offered the following notion of an aesthetic act. For Lopes, an aesthetic 
act is one that depends counterfactually on the actor’s evaluation of aesthetic value (Lopes 
2018b, 32-36). That is, an act is aesthetic if the actor would have done something differently if 
they had a different evaluation of aesthetic value. A painter who paints a line just so because it 
will make the painting most aesthetically valuable is performing an aesthetic act, for if they had 
thought that some other line would have been aesthetically better, they would have painted that 
instead. A painter who puts the line just so just because paintings like this tend to sell well on 
eBay is not performing an aesthetic act. Note that Lopes’s account doesn’t claim that aesthetic 
value is final value or that aesthetic acts are disinterested. For example, if a painter puts the line 
 19	I	am	consciously	avoiding	the	question	of	what	demarcates	the	aesthetic	from	the	non-aesthetic.	For	a	recent	overview	of	those	puzzles,	as	well	as	a	clear	statement	of	how	and	why	one	might	punt	on	the	issue,	see	Lopes	(2018b,	46-48).	
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there because it would make the painting aesthetically valuable, and they wanted to make the 
painting more aesthetically valuable for the sake of money, then they would still be engaged in 
an aesthetic act. Similarly, if they made a painting more aesthetically valuable in order for it to 
have political impact, they would still be engaged in an aesthetic act. What’s crucial in the eBay 
example is that the painter there isn’t taking aesthetic value into consideration at any point at 
all. If we plug Lopes’s account of aesthetic acts into the schema above, then we get the following: 
we trust in somebody’s aesthetic sincerity when we rely on their commitment to act from their 
evaluations of aesthetic value. Obviously, somebody who had actually made those commit-
ments, but who ignored aesthetic value in favor of, say, popularity, would be failing in their 
commitments. 
Notice, too, the crucial difference between an artist who makes something aesthetically val-
uable for the sake of money, and an artist who simply makes something directly for the sake of 
money. In the former case, the artist is still constrained by their sense of value. Such an artist 
might be making a bid for popularity, but still be making art that they take to be good by their 
own aesthetic sensibility and sense of aesthetic value. We see such bids regularly. Consider, for 
example, Miles Davis’ more popular works, like his very approachable cover of the Disney song 
“Someday My Prince Will Come”, and indie director’s Steven Soderbergh’s more overtly pop-
ular works, such as Ocean’s Eleven. These works are acceptable, I take it, because they still bear 
the imprints of their makers’ aesthetic sensibility and sense of value, even as they aim at creating 
a popular work within that sensibility. The true sellout is the artist who abandons their sense of 
aesthetic value, giving it up entirely in a bid for money or the like. 
Crucially, trust in sincerity does not include trust in another’s commitments to take care of 
our aesthetic interests, or to take our aesthetic needs into account. Trust in sincerity does not 
demand any sort of day-to-day reciprocal consideration, nor does the trusting person expect 
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that the trusted person will intentionally cooperate with the truster in any of their particular 
actions. I can trust a narcissist to be true to themselves — and, in fact, I think this is what I am 
often doing when I trust artists and aesthetic interlocutors. My account here takes advantage 
of what is, to my mind, one of the most compelling aspects of Hawley’s view. Her account makes 
no essential reference to any form of goodwill, nor to any intent to cooperate. I can trust people 
because I think they are committed to something; I do not need that commitment to make any 
reference to their care or regard for me. And I think this is characteristic of many of our aes-
thetic relationships. 
 
 
Aesthetic sincerity and the content of trust 
In a moment, I’ll say more about why I think trust in sincerity is so important to aesthetic 
life. But I’d like to step back for a moment and introduce some themes from the discussion of 
the nature of trust in general. The discussion of trust in aesthetic sincerity will, I think, have 
repercussions for the larger conversation about trust. 
Consider a division within the recent literature on trust. On the one side, there’s Hawley, 
whose account of trust involves no essential connection between trust and cooperativeness or 
other such kindly attitudes. On the other side are those theorists who think that trusting some-
one requires imputing some kind of sociable or kindly intent to them. The best-known example 
of such a view is Baier’s account — that we trust others when we rely on their goodwill. As 
we’ve seen, the specifics of Baier’s view have come under considerable fire. However, Karen 
Jones has developed an account in a similar spirit that avoids some of those problems. 
Trust, says Jones, is an attitude aimed at tracking trustworthiness. Trustworthiness, in turn, 
is the disposition to be motivated by others’ dependence on you. To be trustworthy is to be 
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responsive to the needs of others. Says Jones, talk about trust and trustworthiness arises because 
humans are social, interdependent, and reflective. Our cooperative projects force us to depend 
on one another. But we are not simply inert with regard to those dependencies. We can respond 
to each others’ dependencies; we can take the fact that others depend on us into account in our 
own actions. That is the way in which trustworthiness differs from mere reliability. The reliable 
person may act competently and well, but the trustworthy person actively adjusts their compe-
tent actions in light of others’ dependence on them. The trustworthy person, says Jones, takes 
the fact that others are counting on them as a motivation to act as counted on. Trustworthiness 
is the disposition to be motivated to actively fulfill another's dependency on you (Jones 2012, 
62-66). 
The trustworthy person is an active and reflectively self-aware participant in the practice of 
cooperation. So the trusting person can act with reflective awareness of the trustworthy person’s 
reflective awareness. Thus, in Jones’s account, the twin capacities of trust and trustworthiness 
enable a tightly bound, mutually aware, mutually reflective form of cooperation. We can do 
things together if we each can depend on each other, and if we can know that the fact of our 
dependence will motivate each other to act. 
This sort of direct mutual coordination is obviously present in many instances of trust — 
driving in traffic, going to the doctor, learning from a teacher. But I do not think such immediate 
forms of mutual coordination and and such direct, reflective regard for others’ dependencies is 
at the center of our trust practices with art. When I trust John Coltrane enough to pour hours 
of my attention into one of his extraordinarily difficult later albums, the content of my trust 
doesn’t involve an expectation of his caring for me, or his being aware of and responsive towards 
my particular dependencies. I don’t trust Coltrane to try to give us what we want or need. I 
trust Coltrane to make good music and be true to his musical sensibility — to make brilliant jazz guided 
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by his own sense of how it should go. I trust him to be competent and sincere, and one can be 
competent and sincere without being directly and reflectively cooperative. The way for Coltrane 
to fulfill my dependencies on him is for him to, for the most part, forget about me and follow his 
own muse. 
In other words: often an artist fulfills their social role, by, in an important sense, refusing to 
aim to fulfill the immediate dependencies of their audience. Notice the curious motivational 
structure here. I have suggested that the overall social structure of our artistic practice is de-
signed to produce a large-scale coordination of efforts, but not one which will be achieved by 
individuals thinking about and responding to each others’ needs in each particular moment. 
They coordinate with each other in the larger scheme of things by taking up commitments to 
largely ignore each others’ needs in daily practice. Artists cooperate by pledging to be inde-
pendent.20 And audiences typically pledge some analogous form of sincerity: they pledge to hon-
estly report their perceived aesthetic value, rather than, say, praising the works of whichever 
artists need the most emotional support. (Though not all audiences. Your family members, for 
example, may support your work precisely because you need the emotional support, but that 
just reveals that the primary commitments there are familial rather than aesthetic.) 
Think about when we feel deeply betrayed by artists and critics. We don’t typically feel 
betrayed when a musician fails to make music for us. In fact, if they try too hard to make music 
to please us or to satisfy our pre-established sensibilities, we might think that they were pan-
dering. We often feel most betrayed when an artist isn’t true to their own aesthetic sensibility 
— when they have sold out to commercial interests, or just phoned it in out of laziness, or made 
 20	This	comment	modeled	on	my	(2017b)	discussion	of	how	game-players	can,	in	some	circumstances,	cooperate	in	producing	a	generally	good	time	for	all	by	submerging	themselves	in	the	attempt	to	compete	with	each	other.	
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an insincere bid for popularity. A paradigmatic form of indignation in aesthetic life is towards 
sellouts and other forms of aesthetic insincerity. 
Of course, we don’t feel betrayed when we think that they’ve broken their commitments for 
sufficiently good reason — as we are willing to forgive other breaches of commitments, given 
the right justification. And, of course, commitments to aesthetic sincerity aren’t the only com-
mitments in aesthetic life. Jazz musicians improvise together, and that improvisation is clearly 
ruled by a commitment to maintaining active cooperation. A friend promises to make me a mix-
tape to lift me out of my depressive funk; they have made a commitment to respond to my 
particular tastes and needs in the moment. And the commitments to aesthetic sincerity surely 
vary from one role to another. We would not, I take it, feel very betrayed if a member of city 
council recommended restaurants based on the restaurant owners’ politics. Their role involves 
no commitment to aesthetic sincerity. But we would feel very much betrayed if it turned out that 
our newspaper’s restaurant critic issued their recommendations on political grounds, for their 
role involves an implied commitment to aesthetic sincerity. 
Let me note: there are also many cases of commitments to aesthetic steadfastness, and, often 
there are very good reasons for making them. Such commitments can undergird efforts to build 
and maintain a healthy community, for one. In some cases, those commitments to steadfastness 
may be dominant, especially when the aesthetic practices are cornerstones in a community’s life 
— most especially for vulnerable communities. We might, for example, expect to find such com-
mitments to steadfastness around the linchpin cultural practices of threatened communities.21 
But it strikes me that, in much of contemporary art practice, trust in aesthetic sincerity is usually 
dominant. 
 21	Relevant	here	is	Matt	Strohl	and	my	discussion	of	how	particular	cultural	practices	can	count	as	inti-mate	to	a	group,	and	how	that	intimacy	grounds	cultural	appropriation	norms	(Nguyen	and	Strohl,	2019).	
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The pervasiveness of trust in aesthetic sincerity can be glimpsed in its breach. Sellout cases 
are, I take it, paradigmatic cases of aesthetic betrayal, and usually give rise to the most morally 
loaded condemnations. Imagine, for instance, that an artist makes their artistic decisions based 
strictly on focus group data about what will sell well in upscale New York galleries. In that case, 
they have failed in their commitment to act from aesthetic considerations. They are not guided 
by their sense of aesthetic value, nor are they guided by any insight into which aesthetic prop-
erties will arise from non-aesthetic properties. Or, imagine a friend who makes book recom-
mendations based on what will make them seem classy. Again, they have failed to act out of 
aesthetic considerations, and we might reasonably feel that our trust has been betrayed. 
On the other hand, we can be quite forgiving when we think that an artist has utterly failed, 
if the attempt was sincere. The wild overreach, the failed aesthetic experiment — these don’t 
provoke accusations of betrayal. Notice, however that our reactions here are quite complex and 
variable. For example, we seem far more forgiving of aesthetic insincerity when the results are 
aesthetically competent. (Sometimes I point out to people that much of seventies R&B, like 
Earth Wind and Fire, was entirely stage-managed by record companies for popularity and 
profit. To which the response is usually: “Yeah, but it’s good.”) This variability, I suspect, is due 
to complex varying interactions between the twin commitments to competence and sincerity. 
Our reactions to a failure to fulfill one commitment is often moderated by the fulfillment of the 
other. We often forgive the insincere but good, and also forgive the failed but sincere. The situ-
ation is made more complex by significant variances in between different aesthetic communities. 
I suspect that most pop music listeners are far more interested in competence than sincerity, as 
evidenced by the relatively greater degree of anger and betrayal at incompetent music, and the 
relative lack of betrayal at revelations of profit motives in the artists. On the other hand, most 
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avant-garde artistic communities seem marked by much trust in aesthetic sincerity and rela-
tively little trust in aesthetic competence. Though audiences for avant-garde art are still inter-
ested in aesthetically successful works, they don’t seem to treat each other as committed to, and 
culpable for failures at, aesthetic competence. They do, however, seem to treat each other as 
beholden to commitments to aesthetic sincerity. 
Let’s return to Kanye West. In Geavey’s criticism, her sense of betrayal towards West seems 
rooted in a very specific complaint. She is accusing West of being aesthetically lazy. She con-
demns his work, not simply for being bad, but for being “half-hearted.” (It would be a very 
different criticism to say that he had “lost his touch,” and I rather suspect that such a criticism 
would probably not have been accompanied with such vitriolic condemnation.) I take aesthetic 
laziness to be a complex mixture of failures of competence and sincerity. The work is bad, one 
might think, precisely because West had failed to be sufficiently motivated by aesthetic consid-
erations to put in the requisite amount of effort. The sense of betrayal here is grounded, not in 
the works’ mere badness, but in how the badness arose from West’s motivational state. He failed 
to be properly motivated by his apprehension of aesthetic value. 
Notice, too, that different forms of sincerity can come into play, depending on the details of 
the exact aesthetic role and the particular relationship. We trust the curator or the interior dec-
orator to be true to what they think is aesthetically valuable from some kind of objective (or at 
least more socially generalized) standpoint, and to downplay their own personal aesthetic sen-
sibility. But when we argue with friends about great movies, we trust them to be true to their 
own personal sensibility. The same goes for artists. I don’t trust West simply to put out music 
that he has good reason to think is aesthetically valuable — I trust him to put out the kind of 
music that emanates from his own particular aesthetic loves and passions, from his peculiar 
 28 
sense of how his music should be.22 
It should be clear now that the commitment here isn’t the sort that demands direct, imme-
diately self-aware cooperation. This gives us a significant reason to prefer Hawley’s minimal 
account over accounts like Jones’s, which build a thoroughgoing, constant, and explicit mutu-
ality into the very essence of trust. Hawley’s account only specifies that there be a commitment; 
it does not specify that that commitment have any content of sociality, interpersonal care, or 
other sorts of mutuality. That is, one may take up the commitment for a social reason, but the 
content of the commitment is independent action. With aesthetic sincerity, we commit for the 
sake of cooperation, but we do not commit to cooperate. 
Crucially, in Hawley’s account, when I trust somebody to meet their commitments, I don’t 
necessarily trust that they will do so from their motivation to keep those commitments. You 
might commit to cleaning the house, and I might trust you to fulfill your commitment because 
you are a neat freak and you just won’t be able to help yourself. Similarly, an artist might acquire 
a commitment to be sincere by occupying the social role, and then fulfill it out of their utter 
absorption in their own aesthetic interests. In that case, we are still coherently trusting them, 
and they are still coherently fulfilling our trust.23 
 22	One	might,	furthermore,	think	that	we	ask	of	artists	something	narrower	than	staying	true	to	their	own	personal	aesthetic	sensibility	—	to	act	out	of	their	artistic	style.	Nick	Riggle	has	suggested	that	artistic	style	is	a	narrower	category	than	sensibility,	since	it	involves	not	only	what	the	artist	likes,	but	their	personal	ideal	for	their	own	artistic	production	(Riggle	2015).	23	There	is	a	complexity	here	worth	exploring	further.	My	analysis	implies	the	following	possibility:	a	role	may	be	designed	for	the	sake	of	sake	of	social	coordination,	with	certain	commitments	built	in.	A	person	may	step	into	that	role	because	they	think	the	commitments	fit	their	character,	or	for	other	incentives	attached	to	the	role	—	even	if	that	person	lacks	any	personal	interest	in	social	coordination.	The	commitments	have	been	designed	or	have	evolved	for	the	sake	of	social	coordination,	and	the	incentives	may	be	attached	to	the	role	to	promote	social	coordination,	but	the	particular	person	fulfilling	the	role	doesn’t	share	those	interests.	(To	take	an	unusually	explicit	and	clear	example:	a	lawyer’s	professional	commitments	may	be	designed	to	play	a	particular	social	function,	but	many	individual	lawyers	may	not	have	interest	in	those	functions;	they	merely	adopt	the	package	for	the	financial	incentives.)	In	that	case,	I	think	we	should	still	say	the	commitments	are	there	for	the	sake	of	coordination,	even	if	the	individual	taking	them	up	doesn’t	take	them	up	for	the	sake	of	coordination.	I	suspect	that,	when	we	start	to	think	more	about	the	social	design	of	roles	and	their	associated	commitments,	we	will	find	many	this	to	be	a	common	structure.	(For	those	who	worry	about	my	reference	to	
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Consider Marianne Moore, whose poetry springs forth with a truly idiosyncratic rhythm 
and pattern of intellect. As the story goes, when Moore would occasionally try to sound like 
other poets, she would fail utterly. She could not even come up with the most mundane and 
commonplace of nursery rhymes. Here is the poet Elizabeth Bishop’s description of Moore, her 
mentor: 
For my own amusement, I had already made up a completely unscientific theory that Marianne 
was possessed of a unique and involuntary sense of rhythm, therefore of meter, quite unlike 
anyone else’s. She looked like no one else; she talked like no one else; her poems showed a 
mind not much like anyone else’s; and her notions of metering rhyme were unlike all the con-
ventional notions — so why not believe that the old English meters that still seem natural to 
most of us (or seemed to, at any rate) were not natural to her at all? (Bishop 1984, 139-140) 
 
The essay from which this quotation is taken, “Efforts of Affection: A Memoir of Marianne 
Moore,” is an ode of aesthetic love for Moore, for whom Bishop expresses enormous affection, 
and in whom Bishop places extraordinary aesthetic trust. And at the center of the portrait is a 
picture of Moore as entirely and wonderfully aesthetically inflexible. Moore cannot help her 
idiosyncrasy and originality. But note that Jones’s picture of trust is essentially one of flexibility. 
Trustworthiness, in Jones’s picture, is essentially the disposition to change one’s actions in light 
of another’s dependence on one. For Jones, the practice of trust involves adjusting ourselves to 
fit each other’s needs. But Bishop trusts Moore’s art, Moore’s advice about how to grow as a 
poet, and Moore’s recommendations, precisely because Moore’s art and aesthetic talk spring 
from an overwhelming staunchness of character. Bishop trusts Moore precisely because Moore 
will always be honest and unyielding in her loyalty to her own aesthetic sensibility. 
 the	possibility	of	an	unintended,	but	evolved	function.	see	A.W.	Eaton’s	(2020)	useful	discussion	of	how	arti-facts	may	evolve	functions	separately	from	the	intentions	of	their	designers.	I	am	suggesting	that	social	roles	be	a	form	of	artifact,	with	a	evolved	function.	I	plan	to	explore	this	possibility	further	in	future	work)	
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Many of the more traditional, cooperation-centric views of trust might now seem a bit nar-
row. Let me offer a diagnosis of that narrowness. The philosophical discussion about trust on 
which I’ve focused has, historically, come from thinking about ethics.24 And the narrower anal-
ysis of trust is often correct for the moral domain. In moral life, trust does usually involve relying 
on each other’s commitment to cooperation, coordination, and reflective mutuality. In moral life, 
we do actively adjust to each others’ needs in order to get along.  But in aesthetic life, we often 
trust, not those who have goodwill or who are considerate of our needs, but those who are 
aesthetically sincere. And sincerity can sometimes take the form of delightful inflexibility, which 
we treasure in the aesthetic sphere in a way that we do not in the moral sphere. 
Notice that we can specify aesthetic sincerity at differing levels of stringency. In weak sincer-
ity, the requirement is for acting out of aesthetic considerations one accepts. In strong sincerity, 
the requirement is for acting out of aesthetic considerations one has grasped or understood for 
oneself. For example, imagine a head museum curator who, though sensitive to many eras of 
art, happens to have no feeling for Rococo art. When selecting artwork for the Rococo room in 
their museum, they rely on the testimony of Rococo experts  as to what is aesthetically valua-
ble.25 The museum curator fulfills the conditions of weak sincerity, since they are selecting work 
because they believe it to be aesthetically valuable, rather than for its popularity or its invest-
ment value. They are consulting expert specialists on the aesthetic value of Rococo, rather than 
experts on market research. However, the museum curator does not fulfill the conditions of 
strong sincerity, because they do not grasp that aesthetic value through their own experience 
 24	Another	significant	conversation	on	the	nature	of	trust	has	emerged	in	the	literature	of	the	epistemol-ogy	of	testimony.	I	leave	that	discussion	aside	for	the	moment,	for	brevity’s	sake,	since	it	often	leaves	the	nor-mative	dimension	to	the	side.	Trusting	expert	testimony	may	be	more	a	matter	of	reliability	than	of	a	richer,	more	normatively	loaded	form	of	trust.	25	Example	adapted	from	Nguyen	(2017a).	
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or understanding. 
It seems, from canvassing our affective responses, that different social roles in the art world 
carry differently stringent commitments to sincerity. We seem to take solo musicians, painters, 
and novelists to have commitments to strong sincerity, as well as our aesthetic interlocutors. But 
museum curators, actors, and orchestra members we take only to have a commitment to weak 
sincerity, since we are not betrayed by the fact that they are following somebody else’s lead — 
perhaps even entirely subsuming themselves to another’s particular aesthetic sensibility. Notice, 
however, that we do still demand that they try to be responsive to aesthetic considerations, albeit 
via testimony. When I trust a museum curator to be weakly sincere, I am trusting them to be 
looking for experts who are themselves strongly sincere. The actor may not understand exactly 
why they are supposed to deliver their line reading with a hint of terror, but they do so because 
their director tells them to. They may not grasp the particular aesthetic consideration directly. 
But they are still weakly aesthetically sincere insofar as they are obeying their director because 
they trust their director’s direct grasp of the aesthetic considerations. 
Interestingly, this gives us a different way to look at some earlier debates about testimony. 
Many have claimed that one ought not make an aesthetic judgment without having the requisite 
experience for oneself. Some have claimed that this might be a norm that arises specifically from 
the practice of assertion (Robson 2015; Ransom 2017). But if what I’ve suggested is right, then 
the norms around aesthetic testimony are part of a larger practice, in which we demand sincerity 
across a broad range of aesthetic actions, beyond testimony. 
In any case, we have learned something significant about the nature of trust across a broad 
swath of human activities. Accounts like Jones’s, which require that the trustworthy person be 
actively motivated by their understanding of others’ dependencies, seem to describe a version 
of trust suited to distinctively moral activity. But those accounts founder when we consider trust 
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in aesthetic sincerity. The right account to capture both the moral and aesthetic forms of trust 
is Hawley’s. It seems plausible that the content of those commitments have something like a 
Jonesian form in the moral sphere — that they are commitments to act out of an awareness of 
others’ dependencies. But the characteristic form of trust in artistic life aims at a commitment 
to sincerity. I trust Kanye West, but I don’t for a moment think that he cares about fulfilling my 
needs. I trust him to care about his music — single-mindedly, possibly to his moral detriment 
and the harm of those around him. In fact, the character traits underlying his moral flaws might 
be part of the very reason that I trust him so much aesthetically. 
 
 
Why commitments in art? 
Why think that our relationship to each other is of trust, rather than merely one of reliance? 
That is, why think that we aren’t simply relying on each other's predictable behavior, but that 
we are making and fulfilling commitments? I have argued that we do, in fact, have the affective 
responses of betrayal, and that the presence of these responses indicates that we take ourselves 
to be operating in the space of commitment and trust. But the more interesting question is the 
justificatory one: What value might we get from the practices of committing and trusting our 
life with art? What functions might they serve? 
Earlier, I suggested that trust in aesthetic competence was what got us over the hump, mo-
tivating us to put in the effort with difficult art. One might have, at that moment, protested that 
mere reliance in aesthetic competence could play some of that function. After all, I only need to 
have some predictive reason to think that Kanye’s next album will be good, in order to spend 
my effort on it. Why bring trust into the matter? 
The answer should be quite familiar. We involve trust when we bring in commitments, and 
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we bring in commitments when we are attempting to actively structure practices of intentional 
cooperation. In artistic life, audiences do not simply treat artists merely as reliable mechanisms 
for creating good art, and artists do not treat audiences as mere reliable mechanisms for paying 
attention. Artist and audience actively coordinate. This is clearest in cases of difficult art. The 
practice of developing, making, and appreciating difficult art is greatly aided by the existence 
of intentional social coordination. The artist makes difficult art in part because they know that 
an audience has committed to putting in the effort to understand it. And the audience puts in 
the effort partly because they know the artist has committed to making good art. Here, as else-
where in social life, commitments are the grease that enables more complex and entangled co-
operative endeavors. Of course, one could, technically, imagine artists making and audiences 
appreciating difficult art without a structure of commitments in place, just as would could, tech-
nically, imagine a group of people cooking, living, and working together without a structure of 
commitments in place. But it hardly seems possible in real life social circumstances. In most 
human endeavors, we need commitments in order to enable more complex and efficient forms 
of cooperation. 
Contemporary aesthetics sometimes misses the importance of social coordination because it 
is often focuses narrowly on analyzing solitary encounters between an appreciator and a work. 
But the need for social coordination in aesthetic life becomes evident when we step back and 
think about the long-term choices and relationships of aesthetic agents, especially when embed-
ded within aesthetic communities. Think, for example, of the social relationships underpinning 
the development of musical styles. Jazz musicians become specialists because they expect an 
audience to pay attention — and to provide financial and emotional support. Jazz fans invest 
their energy into developing their jazz-listening skills and sensitivities because they trust jazz 
musicians to keep making more interesting jazz. We need those commitments to underwrite the 
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efforts we put into making new art, developing the sensibility to appreciate it, and writing arti-
cles to untangle what it’s all about. 
But though this answer surely captures some of the truth, it does not explain all of the phe-
nomena. For if this were the complete story, the content of our commitments would need to 
only involve commitments to steadfastness and competence, and not to sincerity. We would 
simply need to commit to, say, developing some particular style or genre together. But the pat-
tern of our affective responses seems to indicate, instead, that we  have a particularly emphatic 
interest in sincerity. What might justify the practice of asking for and making commitments to 
aesthetic sincerity? Why might we want such an emphasis on aesthetic sincerity in our aesthetic 
social practice? 
Let me propose two different answers to that question, which I think will intersect in fruitful 
ways. The first possibility is that a social practice centered on sincerity would encourage origi-
nality. We don’t only want more jazz music like what we already have. We value change, inno-
vation, and novelty. And a commitment to aesthetic sincerity, rather than to steadfastness or 
competence, is a good way to promote those interests. We want artists to abandon old styles 
and shift to new ones; we want curators to get excited by new artistic movements and spotlight 
them. We want our friends to evolve their tastes and urge new delights on us. We want critics 
to reach for new interpretations, to surprise us with their innovative takes. This is distinctive of 
the artistic domain over the moral domain. In moral life, I mostly just want people to stay in 
their lanes. If the world were already replete with moral goodness, we might have no further 
interest in moral innovation. But many of us do want an artistic world full of lane-changing, 
category breaking-unpredictability. And, despite the fact that the world is already chock-full of 
good art already — more than we could possibly experience in our short lives, in fact — most 
of us still value further artistic innovation. 
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Imagine, for a moment, that we asked all the members of the art world to commit to being 
steadfast to some particular aesthetic style or sensibility. Bop jazz people should stay steadfast 
to bop jazz, doom metal people should stay true to the sensibilities of doom metal. Commitments 
to steadfastness offers the simplest solution to the coordination problem for difficult art. They 
would guarantee that the audience will put in the effort to a given type of art, and that new 
instances will likely be, at least, within the specified sensibility. But commitments to steadfast-
ness won’t help us achieve other key aesthetic values. By themselves, they offer no reason to 
think that that the coordination will produce good ar, nor original art. 
We could commit, instead, to aesthetic competence. But while that might help us foster good 
art, that commitment by itself won’t help us get original art. It may, in fact, suppress originality. 
Art, when it is creative, is unpredictable; creative artists cannot fully control the success of their 
output, no matter how hard they try. But if artists were to obey a dominant commitment to 
competence, they would have reason to avoid originality, and stick to well-hewn aesthetic path-
ways where success was more assured. If artists took themselves to have a dominant commit-
ment to artistic competence, then they would have  reason to create conservatively. But if they 
took also themselves to have some significant commitment to sincerity, they might be more will-
ing to take risks when their aesthetic sensibility pointed that way. When we are interested in 
fostering a vital, ever-changing, innovative aesthetic community, full of good and original art, 
then the best strategy seems to be for us to take on commitments both to aesthetic competence 
and aesthetic sincerity. And the greater our interest in originality, then the greater the emphasis 
we should put on the commitment to aesthetic sincerity. 
On the other hand, in traditionalist aesthetic cultures, it is more reasonable to expect and 
demand aesthetic success on the regular. So we should expect the relative degree of our ex-
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pected commitments to sincerity and competence to vary between different aesthetic communi-
ties, depending on their relative interests. This is why, I think, we find relatively great emphasis 
on aesthetic sincerity in avant-garde art communities. And it is why we find the strongest com-
mitments to steadfastness and competence in traditionalist aesthetic communities — like, say, 
the one around traditional Japanese cuisine. 
Sincerity seems particularly important here because creativity, innovation, and originality 
are likely self-effacing as ends. What do I mean? A self-effacing end is one which cannot be 
achieved through direct pursuit. The pleasures of love, for example, are self-effacing. I cannot 
get the pleasures of love through direct pursuit. If I tried to love somebody else just for the sake 
of getting the pleasures of love for myself, then I would inevitably fail, for such self-interested 
action wouldn’t really be love. I have to love another person for their own sake in order to obtain 
the particular pleasures of love.26 Let’s now introduce a social variant of the concept. Let’s call 
something a “socially self-effacing end” if it is an end I can achieve with the help of others, but 
not by directly asking them to help me to achieve it. Suppose that I depend on a network of 
artists, curators, critics, and recommenders to satisfy my interests for good art, where some of 
that goodness lies in its originality. In that case, it may be best for the various aesthetic agents 
not to act from a constant awareness of my dependency. In order to fulfill the particular form 
of dependency I have with them, it might be best for them to ignore my interests completely 
and follow their own sense of aesthetic value wherever it might lead. Why? The answer may 
simply be a matter of empirical psychology. Excess concern with the audience’s reception seems, 
for many artistic psychologies, to dim the capacity for creativity. Artistic creativity seems to 
 26	I	am	adapting	here	on	the	literature	on	self-effacing	ends	—	that	is,	ends	that	cannot	be	pursued	di-rectly.	The	language	of	“self-effacingness”	was	introduced	by	Derek	Parfit	(1984,	23-4).	Recent	discussion	has	also	included	(Keller	2007;	Annas	2008;	Hurka	2000;	Pettigrove	2011,	192-3).	
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flourish under conditions of single-mindedness and even narcissism.27 
In the moral domain, I want others to acknowledge my dependencies on them; I want others 
to keep my needs in mind. But in the aesthetic domain, if the ends involved are truly socially 
self-effacing, then the best way to get what we want out of each other is to ask each other to 
ignore our explicit interdependencies and to try to follow our own, ever-shifting internal muses. 
This is also why we might prefer a commitment to aesthetic sincerity, rather than a commitment 
to aesthetic novelty. The commitment to aesthetic sincerity emphasizes the artist’s loyalty to 
their own sensibility, and actively encourages them to ignore their audience in a way that a mere 
commitment to aesthetic novelty would not. After all, the attempt to be novel for novelty’s sake 
can also be pandering. 
Artists, critics, and appreciators often do wander mightily when they follow their aesthetic 
muses. Miles Davis switches from hard bop to modal jazz, and then again to jazz-rock fusion. 
Alan Moore abandons the school of gritty cynicism about superheroes that he helped to create 
with Watchmen, and goes for an over-the-top four-color optimistic style with Top 10 and Tom 
Strong. Bob Dylan goes electric. The same can happen with critics and curators. Lester Bangs, 
early punk critic and extreme punk loyalist, turned against punk in his later years and wrote of 
his great love for the disco and prog-rock sounds of Roxy Music. In these cases, it seems like 
the practitioner is ignoring the dependencies of their audience — at least the most obvious and 
immediate dependencies. The artist seems to not be giving their audience what they’ve asked 
for. 
But why aesthetic sincerity, rather than just sincerity, full stop? Aesthetic sincerity, at least, 
narrows the domain. In practices where we pursue originality, there can be no guarantee that 
 27	Kieran	(2018)	summarizes	past	research	on	this	topic.	
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an artist will find an audience, or that audiences will find art to their liking. But that is the cost 
of engaging in any deeply unpredictable creative endeavor. The best we can do is to collectively 
adopt commitments to aesthetic sincerity — to promise each other to be guided by our sense of 
aesthetic value. We cannot coordinate on a specific aesthetic result, if our interest is in finding 
new results, but we can coordinate on staying together within the realm of the aesthetic. 
This gives us a fuller explanation of why we’d want our coordination to involve a significant 
commitment to aesthetic sincerity, with all the peculiar independence that implies. On the one 
hand, if we didn’t have any sort of commitments at all, we wouldn’t be able to achieve the long-
term goods of coordination. On the other hand, if we had commitments to immediate respon-
siveness to each other’s dependencies, we wouldn’t be able to pursue the goods of originality as 
effectively. What we can find is a middle ground: a long-term commitment to aesthetic sincerity 
that leads us into the same arena, but which also encourages to take our own paths within that 
arena. Commitments to aesthetic sincerity, specifically, encourage individualistic action, while 
compressing it within a particular domain of interest, and so making sincere convergences more 
likely. Thus, commitments to aesthetic sincerity are the right tool for supporting the communal 
pursuit of originality. Notice that we can also add further commitments to steadfastness here, 
which would further compress the domain of interest. This would make convergences more 
likely, at the cost of making verboten many forms of originality. Again, some aesthetic commu-
nities seem willing to pay that price, and others not. 
Let’s now turn to the second explanation for the commitment to sincerity — that sincerity 
supports the value of aesthetic community. (The explanation from community can function in-
dependently from the explanation from originality, though they are also compatible). Suppose 
that you and I happen to share some aesthetic connection. Perhaps you made an artwork and I 
adore it. Or perhaps we are both fans of the same music — perhaps we even discover that we 
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share an inexplicable love for the same odd, fascinating moments of jarring tempo shifts. The 
fact that we share that very specific love may itself be valuable. The value of that sharing may 
take several forms. As Ted Cohen puts it, in a somewhat Kantian mood, some art can be shared 
universally and so lead to a sense of the connection we have to humanity as a whole. Other art 
we may share with a limited number, and through it find intimacy within small communities 
(Cohen 1993). Discovering a shared love for some particular piece of art reveals something 
about our connection to each other — about the similarity of our sensibility, our sensitivity, our 
responsiveness. 
But notice that our sharing here is an exciting discovery only if we arrived at it through the 
independent application of our own sensibilities. If, on the other hand, our sharing were merely 
to arise as an explicit solution to a coordination problem, then we would have learned very little 
about the similarity between our distinctive sensibilities. We would have learned, at most, about 
our cooperative intent. The fact that everybody in America drives on the right side of the road 
is no miracle, nor does it reveal any special nature shared by all Americans. It reveals only that 
we are attempting to live in a society of drivers together, and have settled upon one arbitrary 
solution in order to get along. On the other hand, it always strikes me as something of a miracle 
when I run across somebody that shares one of my more esoteric tastes, like for Thelonious 
Monk’s wild cover of “Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”, or for Madoka Magica, a particularly mind-
bending and narratively perverse bit of Japanese anime. But it strikes me so precisely because 
the sharing was not pre-arranged. The sense of a miraculous discovery only comes about if we 
have navigated to it by our own lights. Otherwise, it would not be a discovery about our shared 
nature. 
Asking that our primary commitment be to steadfastness would actually undermine the pos-
sibility of such discoveries. Under a commitment to steadfastness, any convergences would best 
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be explained as the result of explicit coordination, rather than in terms of some uncovered sim-
ilarity between independent beings. Commitments to steadfastness would make sense if we 
cared most about our aesthetic choices as voluntary expressions of our solidarity with one an-
other, and as symbols of our willingness to change ourselves to fit one another. (And, that is 
what some aesthetic communities care about, and I think, in those communities, we do often 
find steadfastness to be the dominant commitment.) 
But we can support the discovery of a shared nature by encouraging the independent and 
sincere exploration of particular shared domains. If we value the discovery of convergence be-
tween independently-minded actors, then we should build a degree of day-to-day uncoopera-
tiveness into the relevant social practice. The demand for sincerity, then, can be explained by 
our interest in discovering a shared nature, rather than our interest in enforced coordination.28 
And this helps us to towards understanding why the demand for sincerity sits so comfortably 
with the demand for competence. They mirror the twin goals of the aesthetic social practice. 
The point here is that aesthetic life is not about sharing just any old thing; it is about sharing 
our appreciation of works that are good. In our aesthetic practice, we seem to want both to 
encounter aesthetically valuable work, in and of itself, and to connect with each other over our 
experiences of aesthetically valuable works. The social function rides on top of the value of 
independent encounters with aesthetically valuable objects. We want to find beautiful things 
worth appreciating that seem made just for our sensibilities and to discover, in the process, that 
other people had precisely that same experience of value and fit. After all, if we just wanted to 
share something — anything at all — we wouldn’t have such a delightful and surprising discovery 
 28	If	this	explanation	is	to	work,	then	we	should	expect	that	we	demand	strong	sincerity	in	general,	and	that	those	cases	of	weak	sincerity	we	accept	arise	in	special	contexts,	and	usually	involve	parasitism	on	some-body	else’s	strong	sincerity.	I	think	this	is,	in	fact,	what	we	find.	
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of connection. It is precisely that we are each independently going about, looking for things that 
sincerely appeal to our peculiar sensibilities, that it is so especially striking when we discover 
that what delights also delights another. In our aesthetic life, we seem to value discovering a 
harmony between our individualities.29 
This is a kind of communal connection that, I take it, would be largely impossible to seek 
the moral sphere — most especially, the regulated social and legal sphere. Our overpowering 
need to enforce coordination in those spheres make it relatively unlikely that we will have many 
such spontaneous free convergences. But our life with art is different. There, we value creativ-
ity, but we also value our convergences through that creativity. But that value can only be fos-
tered when we encourage individuality. And we can take the risk of non-convergence in aes-
thetic life precisely because the terrain is relatively skew to our basic needs and core social 
freedoms. And when we take that risk — when we permit independence through commitments 
to sincerity, rather than enforced coordination — we court a very special reward. This is why, 
I think, the commitment to sincerity is so distinctive of the aesthetic domain, and why it is often 
more important that we nurture it there. We need to make more explicit commitments to paying 
attention to and responding to each others dependencies in the moral and social spheres. But in 
the aesthetic sphere, we can take risks. We can encourage each other to each follow our own 
peculiar sensibilities, for the hope of finding that special connection — because we will survive 
if fail to find such unexpected harmony. We can take no such risk with, say, the rules of driving. 
And this is why the particular form of aesthetic trust is so distinctive from that of moral 
trust. Aesthetic life is where we ask each other to make the particular commitment to be true to 
ourselves. The forces which pull away from sincerity — to pander, to do market research, to 
 29	Though	the	idea	of	“harmony	in	individuality”	obviously	has	Kantain	roots,	I	am	most	influenced	by	the	recent	articulation	Nick	Riggle	(2017)	has	given	to	this	idea.	
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sell-out — are so strong and the compensations so vivid. But giving in to such motivations would 
undermine the shared leap of aesthetic life. I learn of no special connection in our natures, when 
you changed your artistic style just to pander to my taste, or because you did focus groups on 
my cultural cohort’s preferences. A commitment to sincerity helps underwrite the genuineness 
of our aesthetic convergences. In aesthetic life, we trust each other to each follow our own paths, 
so that it is more meaningful when we do cross paths.30 
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